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We examine whether there is a flight-to-liquidity premium in Treasury bond prices by comparing them
with prices of bonds issued by Refcorp, a U.S. Government agency, which are guaranteed by the
Treasury. We find a large liquidity premium in Treasury bonds, which can be more than fifteen percent
of the value of some Treasury bonds. This liquidity premium is related to changes in consumer
confidence, the amount of Treasury debt available to investors, and flows into equity and money market
mutual funds. This suggests that the popularity of Treasury bonds directly a.ects their value.
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francis.longstaff@anderson.ucla.eduBut what is crucial about this distinction is that the individuals who were moving
from, let’s assume, the illiquid U.S. Treasuries to the liquid on-the-run liquid issues,
are basically saying, “I want out. I don’t want to know anything about whether a
particular investment is risky or not. I just want to disengage.” And the reason
you go into these liquid instruments is that that is the vehicle which enables one to
disengage as quickly as possible.
– Alan Greenspan, October 7, 1998.
1. INTRODUCTION
Historically, ﬁxed income markets have often experienced what are termed ﬂights
to quality where some market participants abruptly want to decrease their portfolio
exposure to securities bearing credit risk. Bank runs and panics, credit crunches, and
sudden declines in the market values of corporate bonds are all examples of the eﬀects
of a ﬂight to quality.1 From an asset pricing perspective, of course, the decrease in the
value of risky debt resulting from a ﬂight to quality can readily be explained in terms
of changes in perceived default probabilities and in the equilibrium required premium
for bearing credit risk.2
In recent years, however, a related but distinct phenomenon has been observed in
the world’s ﬁnancial markets: ﬂights to liquidity. In a ﬂight to liquidity, some market
participants suddenly prefer to hold highly-liquid securities such as U.S. Treasury
bonds rather than less-liquid securities. This is consistent with recent papers by
Woodford (1990), and Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (1996, 1998) who examine the role of the
public sector in providing liquidity to ﬁnancial markets. A recent example of a ﬂight to
liquidity was in the wake of the 1998 Russian default where Treasury bonds suddenly
1As examples, see Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995).
2As examples, see Duﬃe and Singleton (1997, 1999), Duﬀee (1999), and Liu, Long-
staﬀ, and Mandell (2001).
1i n c r e a s e di nv a l u er e l a t i v et ol e s s - l i q u i dd ebt instruments, causing credit spreads to
widen and resulting in major losses at Long Term Capital Management and many
other highly-leveraged hedge funds. Of course, there may have been elements of both
a ﬂight to quality and to liquidity during the 1998 hedge fund crisis.
Given that ﬂights to liquidity may occur, however, it is important to consider
what eﬀects a pure ﬂight to liquidity may have on security prices. Standard asset
pricing theory implies that the value of a security should equal the present value of
its cash ﬂows, and should not depend on how popular the security is as a trading
vehicle. More speciﬁcally, if two securities have identical cash ﬂows in all states of
the world, then the two securities should have the same value even if one suddenly
becomes more popular among investors during a ﬂight to liquidity. Finding evidence
of a signiﬁcant ﬂight-to-liquidity premium in the price of the more popular security
would pose a challenge to traditional asset pricing theory.
This paper examines whether there are ﬂight-to-liquidity premia in U.S. Treasury
bond prices. In doing this, we compare Treasury bond prices with the prices of bonds
issued by the Resolution Funding Corporation (Refcorp), a government agency created
by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement act of 1989 (FIR-
REA). Refcorp bonds diﬀer from most other agency bonds (which usually bear some
small credit risk) in that their principal is fully collateralized by Treasury bonds, and
that full payment of coupons is guaranteed by the Treasury under the provisions of
FIRREA.3 Thus, Refcorp bonds literally have the same credit risk as Treasury bonds.
Since Treasury bonds are more liquid and thus popular among investors (particularly
during ﬂights to liquidity), comparing their prices with those of Refcorp bonds pro-
vides an ideal way of testing whether there are ﬂight-to-liquidity premia in Treasury
bond prices.
The results are surprising. We ﬁnd that during the past decade, there are often
large liquidity premia in Treasury bond prices. In some cases, these premia can repre-
sent as much as 10 to 15 percent of the value of the Treasury bond.4 An exploratory
3In general, bonds issued by government sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank are not explicitly guaranteed by the
U.S. Treasury and presumably carry some small amount of credit risk.
4Although our focus is diﬀerent, these results also parallel and complement the ﬁndings
2analysis reveals that these ﬂight-to-liquidity premia are related to a variety of market
sentiment measures such as changes in consumer conﬁdence and in the amount of
funds ﬂowing into equity and money market mutual funds. Furthermore, the ﬂight-
to-liquidity premia are directly related to changes in the supply of Treasury securities
available to investors resulting from the recent Treasury buyback program. We ar-
gue that these results are unlikely to be explained by diﬀerences in tax treatment,
perceived credit risk, transaction costs, repo ﬁnancing costs, or legal and regulatory
restrictions on bondholders. These results have important implications for current
asset pricing models.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
Refcorp bonds. Section 3 discusses the data used in the study. Section 4 conducts
the empirical analysis. Section 5 evaluates alternative explanations for the results.
Section 6 makes concluding remarks.
2. REFCORP BONDS
Refcorp was established by Title V of FIRREA in 1989. The sole purpose of Refcorp
was to provide funding for the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) which was cre-
ated in the aftermath of the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s as a means of
liquidating insolvent institutions. Until October 29, 1998, Refcorp was subject to the
Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board. At that time, the Oversight Board was
abolished and its authority transferred to the Secretary of the Treasury. The day-to-
day operations of Refcorp are under the management of a three-member committee
composed of the Director of the Oﬃce of Finance of the Federal Home Loan Banks
and two members selected from among the presidents of the twelve Federal Home
Loan Banks. Refcorp is simply a ﬁnancing vehicle and is not allowed to have any paid
employees.5
of Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Kamara (1994), Jordan and Kuipers (1997), and
others who show that liquidity eﬀects may explain diﬀerences in the prices of otherwise
i d e n t i c a lT r e a s u r ys e c u r i t i e s .
5T h i ss u m m a r yi sb a s e do nt h ed e s c r i p t i o no fR e f c o r pg i v e no np a g e s1 2 3 5 - 1 2 3 6o ft h e
Appendix to the Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 2002.
3Beginning in 1989, Refcorp issued six issues of bonds with ﬁx e dc o u p o nr a t e s
ranging from 8.125 to 9.375, and with ﬁnal maturity dates ranging from October 15,
2019 to April 15, 2030. These bonds are listed in Table 1. As shown, the principal
amounts outstanding of these issues range from $4.5 billion to $5.5 billion, making
these issues comparable in size to many Treasury bond issues. The total principal
amount of Refcorp bonds outstanding is $29.5 billion. As with most recently-auctioned
Treasury bonds, Refcorp bonds are eligible tob eh e l di ns t r i p p e df o r mi nt h eF e d e r a l
Reserve book-entry system.6 Refcorp bonds receive the same tax treatment as U.S.
Treasury bonds. In particular, Refcorp bonds are taxable for Federal income tax
purposes, but interest income from these bonds is exempt from state tax.7
From the proceeds of these bond issues, Refcorp purchased a special domestic
series of long-term zero-coupon bonds issued by the Treasury which are pledged to pay
the principal amount of the Refcorp bonds. Thus, the principal amounts of the Refcorp
bonds are completely defeased by the Treasury zero-coupon bonds. Under FIRREA,
and later under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 2000, the Federal Home Loan Bank
system is required to pay some portion of the coupons on the bonds, and thus, coupon
payments on Refcorp bonds represent a senior claim on the Federal Home Loan Bank
system. To the extent that the payments from the Federal Home Loan Bank system
are not suﬃcient to pay the coupon payments on the Refcorp bonds, however, FIRREA
and the subsequent Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act require the Treasury to pay to Refcorp
the additional amounts needed to pay the coupon payments. Through March 2000,
the Treasury has actually paid more than 75 percent of the annual interest owed on the
Refcorp bonds.8 Thus, while the Refcorp bonds are not explicitly backed by the full
faith and credit of the U.S. government, repayment of both the coupon payments and
principal amounts of the bonds is, in fact, implicitly guaranteed by the U.S. Treasury.
An immediate implication of this is that the credit risk of Refcorp bonds is virtually
6The Treasury STRIPS program is described in Grinblatt and Longstaﬀ (2000) and
Jordan, Jorgensen, and Kuipers (2000).
7In some states, capital gains on Treasury and agency bonds are taxable. In other
states, however, these capital gains are not taxable. We are grateful to the referee for
pointing this out.
8See page 17435 of the Federal Register, Vol. 65, No. 64, April 3, 2000.
4the same as that of Treasury bonds.
3. THE DATA
Both U.S. Treasury bonds and Refcorp bonds can be held in stripped form and markets
for both Treasury and Refcorp zero-coupon bonds exist. To measure the size of the
ﬂight-to-liquidity premium, we subtract the yields on Treasury zero-coupon bonds
from the yields for zero-coupon Refcorp bonds with corresponding maturities. The
advantage of using zero-coupon bonds in this analysis is that it allows us to avoid any
possible bias introduced by comparing yields on bonds with diﬀerent coupon rates.
By estimating the liquidity premium as the diﬀerence in yields between Treasury and
non-Treasury bonds, this paper diﬀers from earlier papers such as Kamara (1988),
Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1991), Longstaﬀ (1992),
and Kamara (1994), which compare the yields on diﬀerent Treasury bonds. This is
important because it allows us to uniquely identify the size of the liquidity premium
associated with bonds issued by the U.S. Treasury.9
The data consist of monthly (month-end) observations of yields for Treasury and
Refcorp zero-coupon bonds for the ten-year period from April 1991 to March 2001.
The data are obtained from the widely-used Bloomberg system. This system gathers
quotations for both Treasury and Refcorp zero-coupon bonds on an ongoing basis from
a variety of bond dealers and ﬁnancial institutions. Because of the high liquidity of
the Treasury bond market, prices for Treasury zero-coupon bonds are available from
m o r et h a nt w od o z e ns o u r c e so na ni n t r a d a yb a s is. In contrast, the liquidity of Refcorp
zero-coupon bonds is much lower. Despite this, however, there are typically at least
seven or eight sources that provide intraday or daily pricing information for Refcorp
zero-coupon bonds. To verify that the pricing information is reliable, we checked a
number of the sources providing Refcorp zero-coupon bond prices and conﬁrmed that
the prices are updated on an intraday basis within the Bloomberg system.
9Other relevant papers about the eﬀects of liquidity on asset prices include Lippman
and McCall (1986), Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1993), Longstaﬀ (1995, 2001), Brenner,
Eldor, and Hauser (2001), and Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (2001).
5Since the coupon payment dates for Refcorp bonds are generally one month oﬀ-
cycle from those for Treasury bonds (Refcorp zero-coupon bonds are on a January,
April, July, October cycle while Treasury bonds are typically on a February, May,
August, and November cycle), it is not possible to compute the yield spread from
exactly-matched maturities. Thus, some interpolation of the Refcorp and Treasury
zero-coupon yield curves is needed to be able to estimate the ﬂight-to-liquidity premia.
Speciﬁcally, we calculate these premia by taking the diﬀerences between the constant
maturity .25, .50, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 20, and 30 year points on the Bloomberg fair
value curves for Refcorp and Treasury zero-coupon bonds. These fair value curves are
estimated by the Bloomberg system in the following way. First, closing market data
for all Refcorp zero-coupon bonds is collected. Next, the yields on these bonds are
regressed on a set of variables such as functions of the maturity of the bond (similar
to McCulloch and Kwon (1993), Nelson and Siegel (1987), or traditional cubic spline
approaches). This approach typically results in the zero-coupon yield curve being ﬁt
with a high degree of accuracy; the standard deviation of residuals is usually on the
order of four to ﬁve basis points. From the ﬁtted yield curve, the yields for the constant
maturity points can be estimated directly. The process is repeated using Treasury zero-
coupon bonds and the premia are computed by diﬀerencing the estimated constant
maturity yields.
Although the approach of using the Bloomberg fair value curves is necessitated
b yt h eo n e - m o n t hm i s m a t c hi nm a t u r i t yd a t es for Treasury and Refcorp zero-coupon
bonds, this approach potentially has the advantage of minimizing the eﬀects of illiq-
uidity and measurement errors in prices on the empirical results. In particular, the
estimated ﬁtted values of the constant maturity yields from the regression are likely
to be less sensitive to noise in the prices of individual zero-coupon bonds. Note also,
that since the fair value curves for the Treasury and Refcorp zero-coupon bonds are
calculated using the same algorithm and approach, the diﬀerence between the two
curves should be largely unaﬀected by the interpolation methodology. Finally, the
Bloomberg system uses coupon rather than principal strips in computing these fair
value curves. This has the advantage of mitigating the eﬀects of any reconstitution
option value that might be present in principal strips (see the discusion in Daves and
Ehrhardt (1993) and Jordan, Jorgensen, and Kuipers (2000)). Table 2 provides sum-
6mary statistics for the estimated ﬂight-to-liquidity premia and Figure 1 graphs the
ﬂight-to-liquidity premium for the one-year and 30-year maturities.
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Table 2 shows that there are signiﬁcant liquidity-related premia in Treasury bond
prices. The average premia range from about 10 to 16 basis points and are highly
signiﬁcant even after taking into account the serial correlation of the premia. Table 2
and Figure 1 also show that the premia vary signiﬁcantly over time. The maximum
values of the premia range from 90 basis points for the three-month premium to about
35 basis points for the seven-year premium. We note that the minimum premium for
a number of the maturities is negative. Thisi sc l e a r l yb e c a u s et here are undoubtedly
measurement errors in the data adding noise to the estimates of the premia. Despite
this noise, however, the mean estimates are statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that
the results are not entirely due to measurement errors.
It is straightforward to translate the diﬀerences in yields between the Treasury and
Refcorp zero-coupon bonds into percentage price diﬀerences. The mean percentage
price diﬀerence between the two bonds (measured as a percent of the Treasury zero-
coupon bond price) ranges from .035 percent for the three-month maturity to 5.05
percent for the thirty-year maturity. The pricing diﬀerences for the longer-maturity
bonds, however, can exceed 10 or even 15 percent.
At this point, we have shown that there are liquidity premia in the Treasury
bond prices, but we have not directly linked these premia to the ﬂight-to-liquidity
phenomenon. To this end, we conduct a simple exploratory analysis in which we
regress the premia on a variety of measures that may reﬂect on the popularity of
Treasury bonds relative to other investment vehicles. It is important to acknowledge,
however, that these variables are chosen for their intuitive appeal rather than on the
basis of any theoretical model. Thus, our results should be interpreted cautiously and
very much in the spirit of an exploratory investigation.
The ﬁrst of these variables is the change in the consumer conﬁdence index reported
by the Conference Board. A sudden decline in this widely-cited index may signal that
7there is a greater wariness among market participants holding riskier assets, perhaps
encouraging some to migrate to the safe haven of Treasuries. If the diﬀerence in
yields between Treasuries and Refcorp bonds represents a ﬂight-to-liquidity premium,
we might expect that there may be a negative relation between changes in consumer
conﬁd e n c ea n dt h ep r e m i a .T h ed a t af o rc o n s u m e rc o n ﬁdence are obtained from the
Bloomberg system.
The second variable is the change in the amount of Treasury debt held by foreign
investors. If U.S. investors, who presumably may beneﬁt more from Treasury liquidity
than many foreign holders of Treasury debt, suddenly begin to purchase Treasury debt
from these foreign holders, the yield spread between Treasuries and Refcorp bonds
could increase to reﬂect the increased popularity of holding Treasuries. The data on
foreign ownership of Treasury bonds are obtained from the Federal Reserve Board.
The third variable is the percentage change in the amount of funds held in money
market mutual funds. These funds are short-term nearly-riskless investments. When
investors become concerned about the investment environment, some may have incen-
tives to allocate their funds towards these near-money investments since their values
a r el e s sl i k e l yt ob ea ﬀected by market turbulence. This suggests that if the diﬀerence
in yields between Treasuries and Refcorp bonds represents a ﬂight-to-liquidity pre-
mium, there could be a positive relation between this variable and the premia. The
amount of funds held in money market mutual funds is included in the M3 monetary
aggregate and the data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Board.
The fourth variable is the percentage change in the amount of funds held in equity
mutual funds. The rationale for this variable mirrors that for the money market mutual
fund variable. If investors feel conﬁdent, they are more likely to invest in equity mutual
funds and to allow previous gains to remain in their accounts. Thus, we might expect
that there would be a negative relation between yield diﬀerences between Treasury
and Refcorp bonds and the amount of funds ﬂowing into equity mutual funds. The
data on the amount of funds held in equity mutual funds are taken from the monthly
releases of the Investment Company Institute.
Note that in using these “ﬂow of funds” variables, we are viewing them as poten-
tial indicators of public sentiment rather than as actual changes in the quantities of
8ﬁnancial assets. If investors place more funds in equity mutual funds, of course, the
mutual funds must purchase the equities from other market participants and total ﬁ-
nancial asset quantities may not change unless corporate equity issuance or repurchase
programs are aﬀected. In a market with heterogeneous investors, however, changes in
the amounts held in mutual funds may well represent shifts in the household sector’s
perception of ﬁnancial market risk.
The ﬁfth variable reﬂects the change in the amount of Treasury securities available
to investors as a result of the recent Treasury buyback program. In this program, which
began in March 2000, the Treasury uses an auction format to repurchase longer term
(and typically premium) bonds from market participants. If the spread between the
yields of Refcorp and Treasury zero-coupon bonds reﬂects the relative liquidity of the
two securities, then changes in the amount of Treasury bonds available to the market
may aﬀect the ﬂight-to-liquidity premium. In particular, as the supply of Treasury
bonds decreases through a Treasury buyback, investors may be willing to pay more
of a premium to hold the now more-scarce remaining Treasury bonds. To examine
t h i s ,w ei n c l u d et h et o t a lm a r k e tv a l u e( e x c l uding accrued interest) of Treasury bonds
repurchased during a month as the ﬁfth explanatory variable. The data are collected
directly from the U.S. Treasury new releases on buyback auction results.10
In addition to these variables, we include two other explanatory variables as
controls in the regressions. First, as shown in Table 2, the yield diﬀerences between
Treasuries and Refcorp bonds are serially correlated. To avoid the risk of ﬁnding a
spurious relation between the yield spread and one of the explanatory variables with
similar time series properties, we includet h el a g g e dv a l u eo ft h ey i e l ds p r e a da sa n
additional explanatory variable in the regression. Second, while there is eﬀectively
no default risk in the Refcorp bonds, there may be a market perception that there
is default risk. To control for the possibility that the market believes that Refcorp
bonds have credit risk, we include the spread between the Bloomberg index of ﬁve-year
industrial AAA bond yields and the Bloomberg index of ﬁve-year industrial BBB1
bond yields as a second additional explanatory variable. These indicies are taken
10I am particularly grateful to the referee for suggesting the inclusion of Treasury
buybacks in the analysis.
9from the Bloomberg systems option-free fair value curves for industrial bonds with
the indicated credit ratings.11 Thus, if the spread between Treasuries and Refcorp
bonds is due to a belief that there is credit risk in the Refcorp bonds, this variable
should explain most, if not all, of the diﬀerence. Since this variable represents the
diﬀerence between two corporate yield indicies rather than the diﬀerence between a
corporate yield and either the Treasury or Refcorp yield, we avoid the situation where
t h es a m ev a r i a b l ea p p e a r so nb o t ht h el e f ta n dr i g h ts i d e so ft h er e g r e s s i o n .T a b l e3
reports summary statistics for the explanatory variables used in the regression.
The regression analysis is conducted by regressing the month-end liquidity spread
on the lagged liquidity spread, the changes in the BBB-AAA credit spread, the con-
sumer conﬁdence index, the foreign holdings of Treasury bonds during the month,
the percentage changes during the month in the aggregate amount of funds in money
market and equity mutual funds, and the market value of bonds repurchased by the
Treasury during the month. The regression results are summarized in Table 4. The
results indicate that there is a strong relation between the premium and the measures
of Treasury bond popularity. Thus, this exploratory analysis provides some support
for viewing the diﬀerence between the yields of the Refcorp and Treasury bonds as a
ﬂight-to-liquidity premium.
As shown, the relation between the liquidity premium and changes in consumer
conﬁdence is almost always negative, and is signiﬁcant for the maturities ranging from
two years to 10 years. This is consistent with hypothesis that there is a movement
towards the liquidity of Treasury bonds when consumer conﬁdence drops. The results
also suggest that Treasury bonds with intermediate maturities become more popular
when conﬁdence declines.
Table 4 also shows that there is a strong positive relation between the premium
and the percentage change in funds held in money market mutual funds. The coeﬃ-
cient is positive for all maturities and is signiﬁcant in ﬁve cases. Since money market
mutual funds are conservative investments, this implies that the premium increases
11By calculating the fair value curves using data from bonds without embedded options
such as call features (or from bonds from whi c ht h ee s t i m a t e dc a l lp r e m i u mh a sb e e n
extracted from the price), the Bloomberg option-free fair value indicies of yields should
be largely unaﬀected by variation in option-like components.
10during periods where more funds are ﬂowing into less-risky investments. Again, this is
consistent with the interpretation that the premium increases when investors behave
more cautiously.
The most signiﬁcant explanatory variable of the ﬁve is the amount of the Treasury
backback. The relation between the premium and the buyback amount is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant for all 11 maturities. This provides strong empirical support
for the hypothesis that the premium reﬂects the relative importance of Treasuries as
a safe haven for investors; as the supply of Treasury bonds declines, the remaining
Treasury bonds become more valuable relative to Refcorp bonds.
The relation between the premium and changes in foreign holdings of U.S. Trea-
sury debt is often negative, but is only signiﬁcant for the two year maturity. Similarly,
the relation between the premium and the percentage change in funds held in equity
mutual funds is almost always negative, but is signiﬁcant only for the thirty year ma-
turity. This provides some additional support, however, for the view that the spread
between Refcorp and Treasury yield reﬂects the level of conﬁdence investors have in
the market.
The lagged premium is signiﬁcant for all the maturities, reﬂecting the fact that
there is a high degree of persistence in the premium. Interestingly, the change in
the credit spread is often signiﬁcant, but is uniformly negative in sign. This strongly
suggests that the premium is not a credit spread. If the diﬀerence between Refcorp
and Treasury yields was due to perceived credit risk in the Refcorp bonds, we would
expect the diﬀerence to be positively related to other credit spreads.
5. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
In this section, we consider whether there are alternative explanations that could
account for the diﬀerence in yields between Refcorp and Treasury bonds.
5.1 Diﬀerential Taxation
If there were diﬀerences in the way that Refcorp and Treasury zero-coupon bonds
are taxed, then this might account for some of the ﬂight-to-liquidity premium. In
11actuality, however, both Refcorp and Treasury zero-coupon bonds receive identical
Federal income tax treatment. Speciﬁcally, both are treated as capital assets and
are subject to the standard original issue discount provisions of Sections 1271-1275
of the Internal Revenue Code for Federal tax purposes. Futhermore, under title 12
of the US Code, interest (either accrued or accreted) on Treasury or Refcorp bonds
is not taxable at the state level. In some states, however, capital gains on Treasury
and agency bonds are taxable. In these states, however, the tax treatment given to
Treasury and Refcorp zero-coupon bonds is again symmetric. Thus, it is unlikely that
either the level or the variation in the ﬂight-to-liquidity premium can be attributed
to diﬀerences in tax treatment.
5.2 Bid-Ask Spreads
Since Treasury securities are more liquid that Refcorp bonds, it is not surprising that
Treasury securities have smaller bid-ask spreads. The issue, however, is whether the
diﬀerence in the size of the bid-ask spreads is such that it might account for the ﬂight-
to-liquidity premium. To this end, we spoke with several Wall Street ﬁrms that make
markets in both Treasury and Refcorp zero-coupon bonds. For institutional investors,
the typical bid-ask spread for a Treasury zero-coupon bond is on the order to two to
three ticks or 32nds of a dollar per $100 notional face amount. The typical bid-ask
spread for Refcorp zero-coupon bonds is slightly larger, usually on the order of three
to four ticks. Spreads of this size translate into yield spreads of only about a basis
point or two. Since our analysis is based on the midpoints of market quotes, it is
unlikely that the diﬀerence in the sizes of the bid-ask spread can explain much of the
ﬂight-to-liquidity premium. Even more clearly, diﬀerences in the bid-ask spreads are
unlikely to explain the systematic time variation in the ﬂight-to-liquidity premium.
It is important to acknowledge, however, that while bid-ask spreads on Treasury
and Refcorp zero-coupon bonds may be somewhat comparable, the sizes of the bid
and oﬀer markets at the quoted spreads may be very diﬀerent. For example, an insti-
tutional investor who may need to liquidate his portfolio at some future point in time
might well choose to avoid Refcorp strips (if they were priced at yields very close to
those for Treasury zero-coupon bonds) since the investor might not be able to liqui-
12date his position in a timely manner.12 Consistent with the opening quotation by Alan
Greenspan about the desire to “disengage,” the willingness of investors to pay for a
ﬂight-to-liquidity premium in Treasury bonds may be a reﬂection of their unwillingness
to hold Refcorp bonds at a time when they may wish to liquidate positions.
5.3 Diﬀerential Repo Rates
As discussed by Duﬃe (1996), Longstaﬀ (2000), Liu and Longstaﬀ (2000), and many
others, institutional investors often leverage their positions in Treasury and Agency
securities through the use of security repurchase or repo contracts. If there was a
systematic diﬀerence between the borrowing or repo rates associated with Treasury
and Refcorp zero-coupon bonds, then there might rationally be a valuation diﬀerence
between the two securities to reﬂect the present value beneﬁt of the reduced ﬁnancing
cost. Our discussions with the Treasury and Agency bond dealers indicated that few
Treasury zero-coupon bonds could be ﬁnanced at special repo rates during most of the
sample period.13 Thus, the premium is unlikely to be due to the diﬀerence between
general collateral repo rates for Refcorp zero-coupon bonds and special repo rates for
Treasury zero-coupon bonds. This leaves open the possibility, however, that there
may be a diﬀerence between the general collateral rates available for Treasury and
Agency collateral. To test this, we collected monthly data from 1991 to 2001 on
general Treasury and Agency collateral repo rates from the Bloomberg system. The
mean diﬀerence between the two repo rates was only .25 basis points. Thus, diﬀerences
in the repo rates between Refcorp and Treasury zero-coupon bonds probably cannot
account for the ﬂight-to-liquidity premium.
5.4 Regulatory and Legal Restrictions
Many institutions such as mutual funds, insurance companies, commercial banks,
pension and retirement funds, local government entities, etc. have various regulatory
and legal restrictions on the types of securities they are permitted to invest in. If,
for example, there were many investors who were allowed to invest in Treasury zero-
12I am indebted to the referee for these insights.
13For a discussion of special repo rates, see Duﬃe (1996), Jordan and Jordan (1997),
and Liu, Longstaﬀ, and Mandell (2001).
13coupon bonds, but not Refcorp zero-coupon bonds, then clientele diﬀerences might
oﬀer some explanation for premium. To explore this issue, we did an extensive search
for institutional investors who had posted their list of permissible investments on the
web. These institutions included several dozen states, counties, cities, mutual funds,
universities, and other entities. In virtually every case, the institutions were explicitly
allowed to hold both Treasury and Agency securities.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper examines whether there is a ﬂight-to-liquidity premium in U.S. Treasury
bond prices. This is done by comparing the prices of Treasury zero-coupon bonds
with those of Refcorp zero-coupon bonds. By their nature, Refcorp bonds are ef-
fectively guaranteed by the U.S. Treasury and have the same default-free status as
Treasury bonds. Thus, the diﬀerences between Treasury and Refcorp bond prices can
be attributed entirely to liquidity.
We ﬁnd that the yield spread between Refcorp and Treasury bonds is statistically
and economically signiﬁcant and is directly related to a number of variables such as
consumer conﬁdence, the amount of Treasury bonds repurchased by the Treasury,
and ﬂows into equity and money market mutual funds. These results are consistent
with the view that the diﬀerence in yields reﬂects the willingness of investors to pay
a premium for the liquidity of Treasury bonds when markets are unsettled. This
study provides evidence supportive of the existence of a signiﬁcant ﬂight-to-liquidity
component in Treasury bond prices.
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Refcorp Bonds Issued. This table provides summary information about the Refcorp bond issues from which Refcorp Strips are derived. The
amount issued is in $millions. The data are from the Bloomberg system.
Bond Coupon Rate Maturity Amt. Issued Issue Date Coupon Payment Dates
Refcorp 8.125 15 Oct 2019 4,500 15 Oct 1989 Apr 15, Oct 15
Refcorp 8.625 15 Jan 2021 4,950 15 Jan 1991 Jan 15, Jul 15
Refcorp 8.625 15 Jan 2030 5,000 15 Jan 1990 Jan 15, Jul 15
Refcorp 8.875 15 Jul 2020 5,000 15 Jul 1990 Jan 15, Jul 15
Refcorp 8.875 15 Apr 2030 5,500 15 Apr 1990 Apr 15, Oct 15
Refcorp 9.375 15 Oct 2020 5,000 16 Oct 1990 Apr 15, Oct 15Table 2
Summary Statistics for the Flight-to-Liquidity Premia in Treasury Bond Prices. This table reports summary statistics for the ﬂight-to-
liquidity premia for the indicated maturities, where the premium is computed as the diﬀerence between the yields on Refcorp and Treasury zero-coupon
bonds with the same maturity. The t-statistic for the mean is corrected for ﬁrst-order serial correlation. The data are monthly from April 1991 to
March 2001, and the number of observations for each time series is 120. The ﬂight-to-liquidity premia are measured in basis points.
Maturity Standard t-Statistic
in Years Mean Deviation Minimum Median Maximum ρ for the Mean
.25 13.83 17.14 -35.00 11.00 90.00 .601 4.45
.50 11.61 11.66 -28.00 10.00 62.00 .597 5.52
1.00 11.37 13.46 -13.00 8.00 80.00 .823 2.94
2.00 9.35 10.28 -9.00 6.00 46.00 .767 3.68
3.00 9.66 9.78 -10.00 7.00 44.00 .770 3.96
4.00 10.04 9.54 -7.00 6.00 45.00 .760 4.32
5.00 9.99 9.16 -6.00 7.00 41.00 .752 4.56
7.00 11.41 8.59 -5.00 10.00 35.00 .629 7.00
10.00 13.13 7.40 .00 12.00 38.00 .726 7.84
20.00 14.93 7.58 3.00 13.00 44.00 .815 7.03
30.00 16.28 9.33 2.00 15.00 54.00 .822 6.11Table 3
Summary Statistics for the Explanatory Variables in the Flight-to-Liquidity Regression. This table reports summary statistics for the
v a r i a b l e su s e da se x p l a n a t o r yv a r i a b l e si nt h eﬂight-to-liquidity regression. The variable ∆ Spread is the monthly change in the spread between
the BBB and AAA corporate yields measured in basis points. The variable ∆ Conﬁdence is the monthly change in the Conference Board Index
of Consumer Conﬁdence. The variable ∆ Foreign Holdings is the monthly change in the total amount of foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds
measured in billions of dollars. MM Mutual Fund Percent is the monthly percentage change in the aggregate amount of funds in money market
mutual funds. Equity Mutual Fund Percent is the monthly percentage change in the aggregate amount of funds in equity mutual funds. Treasury
Buyback is the market value in $billions of all Treasury buybacks during the month. The data are monthly from April 1991 to February 2001, and
the number of observations for each time series is 118.
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Median Maximum ρ
∆ Spread -.025 7.526 -25.000 .000 24.000 -.057
∆ Conﬁdence .253 5.264 -12.900 -.200 12.500 .107
∆ Foreign Holdings 5.881 12.073 -17.932 5.046 45.391 .295
MM Mutual Fund Percent 1.045 1.044 -2.198 1.105 3.704 .595
Equity Mutual Fund Percent 2.149 4.111 -15.881 2.856 11.648 -.098
Treasury Buyback .374 1.174 .000 .000 6.115 .908Table 4
Regression Results. This table reports the estimated coeﬃcients and t statistics from the regression of the ﬂight-to-liquidity premium on the lagged
ﬂight-to-liquidity premium and the explanatory variables described in Table 3. The data are monthly from April 1991 to February 2001. ∗ denotes
signﬁcance at the 10 percent level; ∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
Premiumt = β0 + β1 Premiumt−1
+ β2 ∆Spreadt
+ β3 ∆Conﬁdencet
+ β4 ∆Foreign Holdingst
+ β5 MM Mutual Fund Percentt
+ β6 Equity Mutual Fund Percentt
+ β7 TreasuryBuybackt +  t
Maturity β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 β7 tβ0 tβ1 tβ2 tβ3 tβ4 tβ5 tβ6 tβ7 R2
.25 .069 .469 -.342 .0015 -.0009 .524 -.394 .032 3.12∗∗ 5.68∗∗ -2.12∗∗ .68 -.89 .45 -1.36 2.84∗∗ .411
.50 .046 .495 -.266 .0013 -.0009 1.702 -.275 .015 2.91∗∗ 5.98∗∗ -2.37∗∗ .81 -1.27 2.09∗∗ -1.37 1.91∗ .389
1.00 .018 .616 -.149 -.0005 -.0004 1.387 .162 .030 1.54 8.04∗∗ -1.66∗ -.38 -.74 2.10∗∗ 1.02 4.06∗∗ .694
2.00 .029 .580 -.165 -.0024 -.0010 1.360 -.191 .017 2.98∗∗ 7.71∗∗ -2.13∗∗ -2.17∗∗ -1.93∗ 2.29∗∗ -1.37 2.72∗∗ .655
3.00 .033 .511 -.193 -.0023 -.0006 .767 -.029 .026 3.43∗∗ 6.85∗∗ -2.76∗∗ -2.27∗∗ -1.25 1.48 -.23 4.45∗∗ .674
4.00 .031 .580 -.171 -.0028 .0001 .419 -.076 .023 3.06∗∗ 7.85∗∗ -2.37∗∗ -2.71∗∗ .14 .78 -.57 3.92∗∗ .650
5.00 .028 .622 -.205 -.0027 -.0000 .748 -.162 .015 2.84∗∗ 8.55∗∗ -2.94∗∗ -2.72∗∗ -.05 1.44 -1.28 2.70∗∗ .629
7.00 .040 .473 -.071 -.0023 .0002 1.049 .024 .019 3.25∗∗ 5.84∗∗ -.89 -1.97∗∗ .43 1.78∗ .17 3.12∗∗ .480
10.00 .067 .430 -.108 -.0015 .0001 .065 -.148 .025 5.68∗∗ 4.91∗∗ -1.86∗ -1.74∗ .38 .15 -1.38 4.56∗∗ .619
20.00 .049 .581 -.060 .0002 .0000 .751 -.091 .020 4.42∗∗ 7.74∗∗ -1.16 .29 .02 1.96∗∗ - .96 3.97∗∗ .719
30.00 .045 .716 -.069 -.0003 -.0002 .298 -.257 .012 3.65∗∗ 9.73∗∗ -1.06 -.36 -.45 .62 -2.08∗∗ 1.98∗∗ .711Figure 1. This graph shows the ﬂight-to-liquidity premia for the 1-year
and 30-year maturities. The data is monthly from April 1991 to March
2001. The ﬂight-to-liquidity premia are measured in basis points.